

US Macroeconomics

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Gamechanger?

The Bureau of Economic Analysis' annual benchmark to the National Accounts data was consequential. Growth in real gross domestic income (GDI) was revised substantially higher. Previously, GDI had been running substantially below real gross domestic product (GDP) indicating the economy was much weaker and recession prone than the more notable real GDP data had suggested. But this is no longer the case.

Prior to yesterday's GDP report, real GDI was reported to have grown just 1.3% at an annualized rate in both Q1 and Q2 2024. And over the previous four quarters, real GDI was up a modest 2.0%. Post revision, real GDI grew a solid 3.0% and 3.4%, in each of the last two quarters. Over the last year, real GDI is up a solid 3.5%, which is better than the reported 3.0% increase in real GDP.

Nominally, there was a \$393 billion upward revision in corporate profits and a \$782 billion upward revision to personal income. The latter is particularly noteworthy because the substantial revision to income pushed the personal savings rate up nearly two full percentage points to 5.2% for Q2. US households now have more money at their disposal than what was previously reported, thereby helping to underpin continued gains in consumption.

However, the strength in economic activity as measured by both GDP and GDI is at odds with the weakness in the labor market, which appears to be rapidly losing momentum. Moreover, the strength in the broader economy is also at odds with the increase in the unemployment rate which historically only rises when economic growth is slowing. To further muddy the waters, the Bureau of Labor Statistics recently announced that on a preliminary basis it overstated the level of March 2024 employment by over 800k.

Nonetheless, since inflation continues to moderate, the funds rate will move lower over time. The August core PCE deflator rose just 0.13% after only a 0.16% increase in July. Over the past five months annualized, the core PCE deflator is 2.0%, right in line with the Fed's goal. And since the current funds rate is still well above the Central Bank's median 2.9% estimate of neutral, the Fed has an excuse to further cut rates and prevent a further unwarranted weakening in the jobs market. The jobs market will determine what the Fed does next.

There are two more employment reports before the November 7 meeting. It is these data, and not GDP growth, that will determine the size of Fed rate cuts or the lack thereof. Our preliminary estimate for September is weak: nonfarm payrolls are projected at just 85k with the unemployment rate edging back up to its cyclical high of 4.4% from 4.2% in August. This would solidify a 50 bp cut at the November meeting. But if there is an upward surprise to September jobs and this is followed up with some stability in the October report, then it is possible that the Fed does not cut in November. In fact, this was a reason for our 50 basis point (bp) September rate call.

Macro data generally do not trend in a straight line. Even in weak growth environments, there are still mixed signals. Sometimes the economy can show unexpected strength. It even happens during recessions as our previous work has highlighted. And at potential inflection points, which the economy may be at now, the economic picture is even murkier.

When penciling in a 50 bp September rate cut, we thought this would give the Fed some leeway to skip November if the data warranted. But then an eventual reassertion of poor economic fundamentals would necessitate another 50 bp cut at the December 18 meeting.

The meaningful upward revisions in the National Accounts data do not support a 50 bp November rate cut. And if upcoming jobs data surprise to the upside for whatever reason, the Fed may have a difficult time convincing the bond market that back-to-back rate cuts are necessary. The near-term economic and financial backdrop is unusually uncertain. Investors and market participants may need to buckle up.

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